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Hong Kong in United States-China
Relations: the international politics
of Hong Kong's reversion to
Chinese sovereignty
JAMES T. H. TANG*
This article examines the implications of the political transition of Hong Kong on
US-China relations in strategic, political and economic dimensions. It evaluates the impact
of Hong Kong's changing status in the context of the engagement-containment debate on
China policy in the US. It suggests that US concerns over questions such as democracy and
human rights and China's rejection of foreign interference' in Hong Kong would turn the
territory into a source of political conflict between the US and China. Finally it points out
that any major trade confrontation between the two countries would have serious implica-
tions for the territory. The article concludes by arguing that if Hong Kong could continue
to be a prosperous and free society with a global outlook, it would facilitate China's
integration with the global community, but if a reversion to authoritarian rule occurred in
Hong Kong, US-China relations will be aversely affected.
Introduction
The US has been characterized as an 'inactive superpower' over the question of
Hong Kong.1 As the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to the People's Republic
of China takes place, the Hong Kong question seems to have become an important
element in the volatile equation of US-China relations. President Bill Clinton and
other senior officials, including Vice-President Al Gore, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin have all linked the
future of the territory to US-China relations.2 The territory has achieved a higher
profile in US foreign policy considerations, in the words of Richard A. Boucher,
the US Consul General to Hong Kong.3
* James T. H. Tang is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, the University
of Hong Kong. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian
Studies in Chicago, 13-16 March 1997. The author is grateful to Professor Brantly Womack for organizing the panel
as well as the discussants, Liu Debin and Dr Robert Sutter, for their comments. The revision of the paper was further
assisted by a visit to Washington, DC. A conference grant by the University of Hong Kong funded the trip to Chicago,
and an invitation by the Student Council of the University of Virginia at Charlottsville to attend a Symposium on
Hong Kong facilitated my visit to the US.
1. Gerald Segal, The Fate of Hong Kong (London: Simon and Schuster, 1993), ch. 7.
2. See for example, President Bill Clinton's news conference, Washington, DC, (28 January 1997); Vice-President
Al Gore's press conference at China World Hotel, Beijing, (26 March 1997); Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's
address to embassy staff in Beijing, (24 February 1997); and speech by Robert Rubin at the New York Stock Exchange
Board of Directors and European, Asia-Pacific and Latin American Advisory Committees, (2 April 1997).
3. Remarks on Hong Kong's future by Richard A. Boucher at the National Press Club, (27 February 1997).
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As the Clinton Administration enters into the second term, and President Jiang
Jemin of the People's Republic of China (PRC) consolidates his position in
post-Deng China, both governments are attempting to build a more constructive
relationship. The leaderships in both Beijing and Washington, however, still
confront a number of difficult bilateral problems such as human rights, trade
frictions, China's arms sales to the developing world, and Taiwan. By expressing
concerns over Hong Kong, US leaders have made the successful transition of Hong
Kong to a Special Administrative Region (SAR) as a free and autonomous part of
China an issue in their already problematic bilateral relationship. Has the inactive
superpower been activated? To what extent will the Hong Kong question be a new
source of tensions in US-China relations?
Until 1989 the US had adopted a rather low profile approach to the Hong Kong
question. The US supported the Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong's future
which was concluded in 1984. American attitude shifted in the aftermath of the
1989 Tiananmen Incident, when Congress passed the US-Hong Kong Policy Act
in 1992. In fact the US Congress established a separate immigrant visa quota for
Hong Kong in 1990 and offered deferred visa to Hong Kong residents which could
be used until the year 2001. The Clinton Administration has also spoken in support
of Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten's constitutional package which sought to
broaden the representativeness of the territory legislature. But the dominant
analysis of the US position towards Hong Kong is that 'the United States had come
to accept... that Hong Kong would be returned to China and the agenda of
Sino-American relations was filled with far more important issues'. Arguably Hong
Kong remains a low priority area in American eyes compared to other parts of the
world. If a crisis developed in the territory when there are other demands on
American compassion, it has been suggested that, 'the people of Hong Kong may
well not be at the head of the queue for American and Western sympathy'.4
The 1992 Hong Kong Policy Act,5 however, authorizes the US government to
treat Hong Kong as a separate legal entity and requires the Administration to report
to Congress for 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 on developments in Hong
Kong including political changes related to the transfer of sovereignty, agreements
with the US, official and unofficial US-Hong Kong contacts, the development of
democratic institutions in the territory, and Hong Kong's international participation.
The Act also requires, if necessary, separate reports on human rights, trade barrier,
and economic and trade practices. In 1996, Congress amended the Hong Kong
Policy Act by requiring a report for 1996 and additional information on Hong
Kong's Basic Law and its consistency with the Joint Declaration; the openness and
fairness of the elections to the territory's legislature and the chief executive, the
independence of the territory's judiciary, and Hong Kong's Bill of Rights.6 The
House of Representative also passed a Hong Kong Reversion Act in March 1997
to support the autonomous governance of the territory.7
4. Gerald Segal, The Fate of Hong Kong (London: Simon and Schuster, 1993), p. 127.
5. The US-Hong Kong Policy Act, 1992.
6. A comprehensive discussion of the requirements and amendments to the US-Hong Kong Policy Act 1992 and
Congressional actions related to Hong Kong is in Kerry Dumbaugh, Hong Kong's Reversion to China: Problems and
Remedies for the United States (Congressional Research Services, The Library of Congress, 3 March 1997).
7. The Act was introduced by Douglas Bereuter (Republican, Nebraska), Chairman of the House International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Congressional Record, (11 March 1997), House, H841-H849.
420
HONG KONG IN UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS
American interests in the territory are considerable. By the mid-1990s Hong
Kong had become the tenth largest export market of the US, and a major importer
of American agricultural products. US investment reached about US$14 billion and
exported another $14 billion to the territory. There are over 1,000 American
companies operating in the territory, and over 450 operate as regional headquarters.
Each year an average of 65 US Navy ships visit the territory. Hong Kong also
cooperate with US law enforcement agencies on issues like drug trafficking,
smuggling of illegal immigrants, organized crime, and commercial fraud. The US
is also a favorite place for education, with about 14,000 Hong Kong students
enrolled in American institutions of learning each year. In 1996, the US Consulate
General issued 170,000 business and tourists visas to Hong Kong residents, and
over 700,000 Americans visited Hong Kong.8
The list of extensive interests, however, have to be viewed in the context of
broader American interests in China. Although the question of democracy and
human rights in Hong Kong have attracted attention in the US, it is clear that the
US has to weigh its wider interests in the region. The Chinese government, which
has remained uncompromising on the question of sovereignty, has insisted that the
question of Hong Kong is a matter for Britain and China before 1997, and for
China alone afterwards. Yet, the Chinese government is fully aware of the
international interests over developments in the territory and recognizes that what
happens in Hong Kong will have wider implications for China's international
reputation. This paper is an attempt to evaluate the implications of Hong Kong's
changing status for US-China relations by looking at the strategic, political and
economic dimensions of the territory's transition.
The strategic equation
Since the break-down of the consensus in US China policy in the aftermath of
Tiananmen, the policy debate in the US about China has fluctuated between
engagement and containment. Those who are in favor of engagement maintained
that it was not in the interests of the US to isolate China. The way ahead is to
integrate China with the international community and encourage China to accept
international norms and practices and facilitate China's economic reforms which
will ultimately turn China into a more democratic system.9 Those who supported
a more hard-line policy towards the Beijing government argued China's search for
dominance in the West Pacific will inevitably come into conflict with American
interests in the region. China and the US 'will be adversaries in the major global
rivalry of the first decades of the century'.10 Robert Kagan even argued that to
accommodate China's ambitions 'would require changing the essential character of
the United States'. He described those who supported the policy of engagement as
'new China hands' and saw such a policy as perilous because it 'neither satisfies
8. US Information Service in Hong Kong.
9. See for example, Robert Ross, 'Beijing as a conservative power', Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997),
pp. 33-44.
10. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, "The coming conflict with America', Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997),
p. 21.
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the demands of the emerging power nor deters that power effectively enough to
prevent a serious confrontation'.11 Western analysts who viewed China as a
destabilizing power have argued that the US should demonstrate 'an unequivocal
commitment to maintain a US military presence in the Pacific' and 'a gradual
expansion of the network of security understandings between other powers in the
Pacific'.12
Similar sentiments and debates are mirrored in the Chinese capital. Although
many Chinese analysts maintained despite their differences, China and the US
shared common interests needed each other,13 anti-American feelings have been
running strong in the last couple of years. Many Chinese analysts believed
Washington harbored deep hostility towards China's social system, and did not
wish to see a developed and strong China.14 The US attitude, described as a
hegemonist mentality, was seen to be partly based on a sense of racial as well as
cultural superiority.15 A Chinese journalist, after a 6-month working visit to a major
newspaper concluded that the US media has demonized China because of American
interests in 'seeking political, economic, military and cultural hegemony in the
world'.'6 More significantly, the resentment against the US seemed to be rather
popular among the younger generation of intellectuals. Books with strong anti-
American sentiments like Zhongguo keyi shuobu [China That Can Say No] have
been extremely popular (the 50,000 copies of the first edition were sold out
immediately). One of the authors of the book argued that China should counter-
contain the US if the Americans continue to play the role of world police and
exercise hegemonism.17
Since 1993 the Clinton Administration and the Beijing leadership have attempted
to improve bilateral ties. Although differences over human rights, trade, armament
proliferation, and the Taiwan question had created difficulties, Clinton and Jiang
have emphasized the importance of a cooperative US-China relationship and
declared their commitment to work towards establishing a more constructive
relationship in 1996. Following the death of Deng Xiaoping, President Clinton
declared that Administration's policy of engagement would continue and plans for
the exchange of visits between the two presidents would not be affected.18 The
importance of the US in Chinese foreign policy under Jiang's leadership was
clearly reflected when the leadership insisted that Secretary of State Albright's visit
to Beijing in February 1997 should not be affected by the death of Deng. President
Jiang also repeatedly spoke of the importance of US-China relations. Yet as the
11. Robert Kagan, 'What China knows that we don't: the case for a new strategy of containment', The Weekly
Standard, (20 January 1997), p. 26.
12. Gideon Rachman, 'Containing China', The Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1996), p. 130.
13. Jin Canrong, 'Sino-US relations: an overview', Beijing Review, (21-27 October 1996), pp. 9-11.
14. Zhang Zeyu, 'US containment strategists misled', Beijing Review, (16-22 October 1995), p. 4.
15. Shi Yinhong, 'Why against China?', Beijing Review, (21-27 October 1996), p. 11.
16. Li Xiguang, 'US media: behind the demonization of China', Beijing Review, (21-27 October 1996), p. 12.
17. See Si Cheng, 'Chinese say "No" to the United States', Beijing Review, (21-27 October 1996), p. 13. The book
ranked among other highly serious academic books in philosophy and history, as the number one best seller in Feng
Ru Xiong, a bookshop for intellectuals located near Peking University, during the author's visit to Beijing in October
1996.
18. White House transcript of President Clinton's questions and answers with reporters on China, (20 February
1997).
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debates in both capitals indicate, the fragility of US-China relations, as identified
by Harry Harding, has not been fundamentally altered. Hong Kong's return to
Chinese sovereignty introduces another element in the complex picture.
From Beijing's perspective, the recovery of Hong Kong not only represents a
historic moment in the eradication of China's national humiliation, but also one
more important step in enhancing China's rise as a major power. Beyond the
emotional dimension of nationalism, Hong Kong is also a key element in the
China's development strategy. This recognition of Hong Kong's contribution to the
Chinese economy laid the foundation of the Beijing leadership's decision to
maintain Hong Kong's special status. The reunification with Hong Kong will bring
about changes in the East Asian strategic picture. As a British territory, Hong Kong
has been part of the western alliance during the Cold War. Although the description
'Berlin of the East' may not be accurate, the territory did serve as a base for
western forces. British troops from Hong Kong were involved in the Korean
conflict in the early 1950s. The port of Hong Kong served as a port of call for
western naval ships stationed in the region and for the transhipment of strategic
goods. During the Vietnam War, Hong Kong was a destination for American
soldiers for rest and recreation as well as replenishment. It has continued to offer
port facilities to American ships. Although changes in the global strategic balance
in the 1970s and the end of US containment policy against China has reduced the
significance of Hong Kong, the territory has remained part of the western network
in the East Asian region. Although as the US attempts to redefine its strategic role
in post-Cold War East Asia, Hong Kong is not usually seen as an element in the
equation, the China-Hong Kong reunification will almost certainly enhance China's
status a major power in the region.
Since China has defence and diplomatic responsibilities over Hong Kong, the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) are stationed in the SAR. Under the 1994
Sino-British Agreement on the transfer of military sites in the territory the PLA
took over major British military sites on 1 July 1997. These included a naval
base on stonecutter island equipped with modern facilities. Although it is unlikely
that the Chinese leaders would use Hong Kong as a base for military ventures,
Chinese military presence, the acquisition of a new naval base at a strategic
location, plus the development of a regional military base in Shenzhen could
strengthen Chinese coastal defence and possibly facilitate China's military pro-
jection in the region.19
Since 1989 many western observers have also expressed concern about a China
threat to regional stability. Although the People's Republic of China has become
a major power in the Asia-Pacific region and a rapidly rising economic power, its
aspiration has not been completely fulfilled. The China threat theory, as summa-
rized by Denny Roy, suggests that China is still an authoritarian and unstable
regime which is more war-prone, and it is also a dissatisfied power seeking to
recover lost territory and prestige.20 Chinese leaders have repeatedly denounced the
19. See discussions in James T. H. Tang, 'Hong Kong's political transition and regional security', China News
Analysis, (15 May 1995). A fuller version is in James T. H. Tang, 'China incorporates Hong Kong: implications for
international security in the Asia-Pacific region', in Takashi Inoguchi and Grant B. Stillman, eds, North-East Asian
Regional Security: The Role of International Institutions (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997), pp. 79-97.
20. Denny Roy, 'Hegemon on the horizon? China's threat to East Asian security', International Security 19(1),
(Summer 1994), pp. 149-168.
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theory as an attempt to prevent the rise of China.21 But Chinese nationalism is
clearly an important element shaping the outlook of the leadership, and many
Chinese people.22 The debate concerning the rise of China is likely to remain
controversial for some time, but as one observer put it, 'China's sheer size and
growing power are already altering the contours of Asian security, international
commerce, and the global balance of power'.23 American concerns over issues such
as human rights and democracy in Hong Kong clearly would have an impact on the
engagement-containment debate.
On the other hand, the Chinese leaders are also concerned about 'western
influences' in Hong Kong. They are highly suspicious of western motivation in
internationalizing the Hong Kong question. Vice-premier and Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen, for example, has remarked that while it is understandable for western
governments to be concerned about developments in the territory, foreign countries
have no right to interfere with affairs in Hong Kong.24 The return of Hong Kong
to Chinese sovereignty thus will pose difficult questions about regional security at
a time when US-China relations are still highly volatile.
Democracy in Hong Kong
Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty would mark, warned an American
observer, 'the beginning of the end of most political freedoms and the respect for
human rights that the 6.3 million inhabitants of Hong Kong now enjoys—to say
nothing of the prospects for democracy' and the territory's fate 'will also pose a
formidable challenge to America policy of "constructive engagement" with
China'.25
The US government has openly supported the development of 'open, account-
able, and democratic institutions' in Hong Kong. In its 1996 annual report to
Congress, the Administration made clear that it would like to see the current
legislators continue to serve beyond 1997 when their terms expired rather than
being replaced by members of the Provisional Legislative Assembly. It has also
sponsored a professional journalism exchange programme between the US and
Hong Kong with the openly stated objective of equipping the local media with the
tools needed to address the question of self-censorship.26
The Chinese government's view towards democracy is, not surprisingly, dia-
metrically opposite to the American position. Until the early 1980s when the
Chinese government indicated that it would like to resume sovereignty over Hong
Kong, the colonial political structures in the territory had not undergone any
significant changes.27 When the Sino-British talks over Hong Kong's future began
21. A number of publications on the subject have appeared in China. See, for example, Ezhi zhongguo: shenhua
yu xianshi [Containing China: Myth and Reality] (Beijing: Zhongguo yinshi chubanshe, 1996).
22. See, for example, Allen S. Whiting, 'Chinese nationalism and foreign policy after Deng', China Quarterly,
(June 1995), pp. 295-316.
23. David Shambaugh, 'Containing or engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's responses', International
Security 21(2), (Fall 1996), p. 180.
24. A full text of Qian Qichen's press conference is in Wen Wei Po, (8 March 1997).
25. Tad Szulc, 'A looming Greek tragedy in Hong Kong', Foreign Policy, (Spring 1997), p. 77.
26. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act Report, 1996.
27. Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 3rd edn (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1981), p. xv.
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in 1982, political power was still highly centralized in the hands of a Governor
appointed by the British government in London, who ruled the territory through the
appointment of community leaders and key business figures to the colonial
establishment and a Legislative Council comprised of senior civil servants and
other appointed members.
If Hong Kong's colonial political status has remained unchanged for over a
century by the early 1980s, it had risen to be a key financial and trade centre and
cosmopolitan metropolis with global economic links, and thrived as a major hub for
business information and international traffic, attracting professionals and business
people from all over the world. The colonial authority maintained rule of law and
a relatively corrupt free and efficient civil service. It has also adopted a hands-off
approach in economic management and granted a high degree of freedom to the
people living in the territory. This has helped foster Hong Kong's reputation as a
free society rather than an oppressed colonial territory. The Hong Kong people
have been widely seen as politically apathetic and passive.28 Arguably Hong
Kong's success has been possible because of the absence of political agitation.
Colonial Hong Kong was dominated by the business elite.29 While there were
anti-colonial outbursts and violent demonstrations against the Hong Kong govern-
ment, most Hong Kong people seemed reluctant to challenge British colonial rule
directly. Through a process which has been described as administrative absorption
of politics, Hong Kong maintained political stability without democracy.30
By the 1970s, however, much better educated and with a stronger sense of
belonging, the people of Hong Kong began to press harder for political change. The
Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's future in the 1980s further politicized
Hong Kong society. Since the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration over
the future of Hong Kong, democratization has become a focal point in local
politics. The rapid growth of the democratic movement is partly the result of the
rise of middle class and partly the result of greater British tolerance for the demand
for political participation in the governmental process. But most important of all,
the prospect of reunification generated a degree of uncertainty about Hong Kong's
political future under Chinese sovereignty. This led to intense debates about the
nature of the political system and the issue of democratization emerged as a focal
point of public attention in the territory. In the mid-1980s the Hong Kong
government toyed with the idea of introducing limited democratization in the form
of elected seats in the Legislative Council in 1988.31 The Beijing government,
28. Richard Hughes, Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and Its Many Faces (London: Andre Deutsch,
1976). See also discussions in Lau Siu-kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
1982), pp. 1-23.
29. Richard Hughes, Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time, p. 17.
30. See for example, Siu-Kai Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,
1982).
31. The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer,
1984); White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
Government Printer, November 1984). For a useful account of the Hong Kong government's position on development
of representative government see Norman Miners, 'Moves towards representative government in Hong Kong'; for
the debate on the issue of representative government see Stephen N. G. Davies, 'The changing nature of representation
in Hong Kong polities', in Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron Mushkat, eds, Hong Kong: The Challenge of
Transformation (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1989).
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which rejected rapid democratization as a British ploy for continuing British
colonial influences in the territory, viewed the introduction of representative
government in Hong Kong with suspicion. During the Sino-British talks, the
Chinese side rejected the inclusion of a detailed plan for representative government
in the Joint Declaration.32 Although the Hong Kong government eventually de-
clared its commitment to democratization, it announced that direct elections were
to take place only in 1991.33 The British and Chinese governments sought to
establish political institutions which could survive the transfer of sovereignty under
the 'through train arrangements' (Zhi tong che) in accordance with the Basic
Law—the mini constitution for the Hong Kong SAR.
While the Basic Law (finalized in 1990) spelt out a time-table for the gradual
introduction of more directly elected seats in the Legislative Council, democratiza-
tion became a major issue on Hong Kong's political agenda. Demand for a more
representative government intensified as a result of the 1989 Tiananmen Square
Incident. The people of Hong Kong had rallied in open support of the pro-
democracy movement in China. As part of a number of measures to restore political
confidence in post-Tiananmen Hong Kong, the British government announced that
the plans for the 1991 elections would have to be reconsidered.34
In the end the pro-democracy camp led by the United Democrats of Hong Kong
won a landslide victory in the 1991 elections.35 Out of the 18 directly elected seats,
the United Democrats won 12 seats, with 2 other seats going to an allied group, the
Meeting Point, another pro-democracy group, the Association for Democracy and
People's Livelihood, won one seat. The pro-democratic camp (allied groups and
sympathetic independents) as a whole won about 67.5% of the vote. The Chinese
government, however, attempted to downplay the significance of the election
results by referring to the low turnout rate of the elections (39.15%). In fact the
Chinese government has consistently argued that the Legislative Council was only
an advisory body to the colonial government and therefore not representative of the
Hong Kong public. Ian Scott argued the 1991 elections were 'votes without power
for if the Chinese chose to do so they could block the process of democratization' ,36
The arrival of Chris Patten as Hong Kong's Governor in 1992 marked another
period of confrontation between Britain and China over constitutional reform in the
territory. The Patten proposal would broaden the electoral base of the functional
constituencies considerably, giving all working people in Hong Kong the right to
vote in a broadly based functional constituency and widen the scope of representa-
32. A summary of the Chinese attitude can be found in Yu Shengwu and Liu Shuyong, eds, Ershi shiji de Xianggang
[Hong Kong in the Twentieth Century] (Beijing: Zhongguo dabaikequanshu chubanshe, 1995), pp. 309-321.
33. Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government (Hong Kong: Government
Printer, November 1987).
34. House of Commons Debate on China and Hong Kong, (13 July 1989).
35. For analysis of the election results see Rowena Kwok, Joan Leung and Ian Scott, eds, Votes Without Power:
The Hong Kong Elections 1991 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992); Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun,
Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong (The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993).
36. See Ian Scott, 'An overview of the Hong Kong Legislative Council elections of 1991', in Rowena Kwok, Joan
Leung and Ian Scott, eds, Votes Without Power: The Hong Kong Elections 1991 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1992); on voter turnout rate, pp. 6-9, on the limitation of the elections in the democratization of Hong Kong,
p. 24.
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tion in the Legislative Council. But the proposal clearly went beyond what the
Chinese had in mind and represented a departure from the established practice of
close Sino-British consultation over political arrangements for the territory.37 The
proposal was flatly rejected by the Chinese government as unacceptable for "three
violations" (san wei fan)—violating the Joint Declaration, the principle of conver-
gence with the Basic Law, and the Sino-British understanding on the pace of
democratization for Hong Kong between the two governments.
With the collapse of the 'through train' understanding, both sides went ahead
with their versions of what would be the most appropriate political arrangements
for Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government made the necessary legislative
changes for the Patten plan and the 1995 Legislative Council elections resulted in
another overwhelming victory for the pro-democracy camp. The Democratic Party,
with 19 candidates elected, became the largest party in the Legislative Council.38
The Chinese side unilaterally set up a 'second stove' in the form of a preliminary
work committee comprising mostly pro-Beijing figures to deliberate on the political
structures of Hong Kong beyond 1997. A Provisional Legislative Assembly was
subsequently formed in December 1996 in the neighbouring town of Shenzhen just
across the border when a 400-strong selection committee was chosen by a
preparatory committee for the Hong Kong SAR elected members to the provisional
body.
Although over half of the 60 Assembly members serve concurrently in the Hong
Kong Legislative Council in Hong Kong, the membership is dominated by those
with pro-Beijing backgrounds. Many Assembly members also served in the
National People's Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Confer-
ence, or are members of the Selection Committee themselves. The pro-Beijing
groups such as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong won 10
seats, while another pro-Beijing group representing business interests, the Liberal
Party, obtained another 10 seats. The pro-democracy camp, with the exception of
the Association for the Promotion of People's Livelihood, boycotted the election.
Following the establishment of the Provisional Legislative Assembly, Martin Lee,
the leader of the Hong Kong Democratic Party, the territory's most popular
political party, declared that it was the darkest hour for democracy for Hong Kong.
But Lee indicated his party's commitment to take part in the first SAR Legislative
Assembly elections based on direct polls which is scheduled to take place in
1998.39
While the Clinton Administration supports the 'one country, two systems'
formula, it has also expressed concerns over specific political developments in
the territory. Washington has put on record its disapproval of the Chinese
government's policy to replace the popularly elected Legislative Council with a
37. 'Our next five years: the agenda for Hong Kong', the Governor's Policy Address at the Opening of the 1992/93
Session of the Legislative Council, pp. 30-43.
38. For an in-depth treatment of the 1995 elections see, Kuan Hsin-chi, Lau Siu-kai, Louie Kin-sheun and Wong
Ka-ying, eds, The 1995 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Institute of Asia-Pacific
Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996).
39. The results were covered extensively by the local media. See for example reports in South China Morning Post,
The Hong Kong Standard, Ming Pao, Wen Wei Po, (22 December 1996).
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Provisional Legislative Assembly chosen by a selected group of people many of
whom are known to be close to the Beijing government. The Clinton Administra-
tion also accused the Beijing government of being insensitive to the way how Hong
Kong works politically over issues such as the scrapping and amending parts of the
Bill of Rights, and the exclusion of the Democratic Party from the Preparatory
Committee.40
In fact a number of outspoken Congressional members, suspicious of Chinese
intentions in Hong Kong, even went further in expressing reservations about
whether democracy could flourish in the territory. Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, stated in a Congressional
hearing that the US should not 'let Hong Kong go by the boards or be swept in a
Tiananmen Square sort of thing, because a leopard may not change its spots, and
neither will Beijing, until there is a new regime in'.41 While not all Congressmen
share this view, their support for the 1997 Hong Kong Reversion Act clearly
indicated bipartisan and broad Congressional concerns over Hong Kong. The Act
stated that 'the failure to have an elected legislature would be a violation of the
Joint Declaration of 1994 and calls upon the Government of the People's Republic
of China to honor its treaty obligations' .42 When the Speaker of the House, Newt
Gingrich, passed through Hong Kong after his visit to China in March 1997, he
expressed concern over the dissolution of the elected Legislative Council and the
protection of civil liberties. He remarked that any changes to laws concerning civil
rights in Hong Kong would 'significantly affect Hong Kong's attractiveness as a
regional center for commerce', and unilateral changes would 'indicate that China
values power over keeping its word'.43 In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing on US-China relations after Deng Xiaoiping, former Ambassador to China,
James Liley, maintained that how China would treat Hong Kong could be a litmus
test of China's intentions and ambitions.44
The Chinese government, naturally, resented American criticism of its Hong
Kong policy. Beijing maintained both that the election of Tung Chee-hwa by the
Selection Committee as Chief Executive and that the formation of Provisional
Legislative Assembly were steps towards more democracy for the territory, refer-
ring to the fact that all the previous governors of Hong Kong under British rule
were appointed by London. On 25 December 1996, in response to a statement by
the Foreign Office in London, Xinhua newsagency rejected British criticism against
the Provisional Legislative Council and referred to British efforts in seeking
international support to exert pressure on the Chinese government as ridiculous.
The commentary reiterated the official stand that 'the question of Hong Kong is a
matter between China and Britain before it returns to China. After that, Hong Kong
will be an internal affair of China, and no foreign government will have the right
40. Winston Lord's remarks at a hearing of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, (18 July 1996).
41. Hearing of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
(18 July 1996).
42. Congressional Record, (11 March 1997), House, H842.
43. Remarks by Newt Gingrich at the Hong Kong American Chamber of Commerce, (27 March 1997).
44. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, (18 March 1997).
The author was present at the hearing.
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to interfere in China's affairs'.45 Popular sentiments as reflected by works produced
by young intellectuals in China described the US policy towards Hong Kong as a
conspiracy with other western governments in internationalizing Hong Kong in
pursuit of American interests in the Asia-Pacific region as well as testing China's
ambition and determination.46 Responding to the passing of the Hong Kong
Reversion Act by the House of Representative, a Xinhua newsagency commentary
referred to a record of American intervention on matters related to Hong Kong,
describing the US as displaying the ugly hegemonic mentality of some Con-
gressional members.47 The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman formally rejected
the Act as a brutal interference of China's internal matters.48
Different opinions on the nature of implications of democratization for Hong
Kong have thus continued to generate political tensions between China and the
West and are a source of political polarization within Hong Kong. The establish-
ment of the SAR government on 1 July is not going to remove the issue from Hong
Kong politics. The SAR administration under Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa
would not be able to restore the colonial-political framework which existed prior
to the 1980s. In any case the present system will have to give way to institutional
arrangements specified in the Basic Law which are making electoral politics an
essential part of the political process in Hong Kong. By 2003 the Legislature will
be comprised of 30 directly elected members and 30 functional constituency elected
members. Electoral politics and political parties may be conducted differently under
the SAR administration, but they have become an accepted part of the political
process in the territory. The population of Hong Kong have also become far more
politicized and more vocal in their political demand as a result of the developments
since the mid-1980s.
Given the different political cultures and values in mainland China and Hong
Kong, the aspiration for more democracy in Hong Kong will no doubt be a major
challenge in the process of Hong Kong's transition. Recent surveys on political
attitudes in Hong Kong suggest the commitment to democracy of the Hong Kong
people is still marked by ambivalence. Kuan and Lau identified that rising demand
for democracy in Hong Kong is matched by intricate ambiguities and can be
characterized as merely partial commitment.49 Moreover, the people of colonial
Hong Kong may also become highly nationalist, as evidenced by their protest
against Japanese militarism over the disputed Diaoyu islands (or Senkaku islands
according to the Japanese) in the summer of 1996. Thus the impact of the Hong
Kong's political transition on the direction of democratic change in the territory and
the population's identity and aspirations remains a question which is not easy to
answer.
Nonetheless, how China's more conservative approach to politics interacts with
45. Xinhua, (25 December 1996).
46. Erzhi zhongguo: shenhua yu xianshi [Containing China: Myth and Reality] (Beijing: Zhongguo yinshi
chubanshe, 1996), pp. 268-382.
47. Xinhua, (19 March 1997). Full text in Wen Wei Po, (20 March 1997).
48. Wen Wei Po, (14 March 1997).
49. Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai, "The partial vision of democracy in Hong Kong: a survey of public opinion',
The China Journal 34, (July 1995), p. 263.
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the aspirations of a politically more active Hong Kong will clearly be a critical
issue in the political development of the Hong Kong SAR. US-China differences
over the development of democratic institutions in Hong Kong is not the core
problem in their relationship, but such differences may intensify bilateral
difficulties.
Economic relations
Hong Kong is dependant on both China and the US for its economic survival.
China is Hong Kong's production base, an important source of supply, and
increasingly, investments. At the same time the US is one of Hong Kong's most
important markets and investors. While both the US and China share common
interests in developing bilateral trade and economic cooperation, their economic
relations have been rather problematic. Hong Kong is often caught between the
economic conflicts of its two most important economic partners. The Hong Kong
government estimated in 1997 that if the US were to revoke China's Most Favored
Nation trading status, the territory would lose HK$246 billion trade and up to
86,000 jobs, leading to a reduction of its GDP growth rate by almost 50%.50 The
territory has always lobbied Washington to grant MFN status to China, arguing that
otherwise Hong Kong would suffer economically.
In the past US-China political relations have always been important in determin-
ing their economic relations. The expansion of bilateral trade throughout the 1970s
and the 1980s was only made possible by the improving of US-China diplomatic
relations. Washington extended the Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment to
China in a bilateral trade agreement in 1980, subject to renewal on an annual basis.
Since 1989 Washington has used MFN as a political instrument, such as requiring
China to meet certain human rights conditions. But the Clinton Administration
decided to delink human rights with trade matters in 1994, reversing the order of
importance between economic and political considerations. In fact US direct
investment in China reached $1.7 billion at the end of 1994 and China was the
US's thirteenth largest export market in 1995. According to Washington, US trade
deficit with China reached US$39.5 billion in 1996, $5.7 billion greater than in
1995. US merchandise exports to China for 1996 were nearly $12 billion, up $230
million, or more than 2% from 1995.51
US-China frictions over trade matters have concentrated in three areas: China's
trade surplus with the US, the protection of intellectual property rights, and market
access. China had strengthened its intellectual property legislations from the early
1990s onwards and acceded to major international agreements on copyrights and
trade marks. But the US has been dissatisfied with the enforcement of the laws,
describing it as 'sporadic at best, and virtually nonexistent with regard to copy
righted works'. Market access is another difficult issue. Although the two signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on market access in 1992 and introduced appropri-
50. South China Morning Post, (5 April 1997).
51. US Trade Representative Office, The 1996 National Trade Estimate for the People's Republic of China, (March
1997).
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ate measures to open its market, there are still differences over license and quota
requirements, additional non-tariff measures, as well as the transparency of the
Chinese trade regime.52
The Chinese government, however, rejected American assertions that the US
suffered from a huge trade deficit in its trade with China. The Chinese figures were
far more moderate than the US figures. For example, the Chinese government
suggested that it had a trade surplus of only US$8.59 billion in 1995 when the US
claimed that its trade deficit with China was US$33.81 billion. The Minister of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Wu Yi suggested that a large proportion
of trade between China and the US was entreport trade through Hong Kong. Wu
maintained that bilateral US-China trade had been held hostage to different
understanding of trade balance.53 Over intellectual property protection, the Chinese
government also maintained that the US government were making unwarranted
accusations against Beijing's efforts.54 Their differences have resulted in very
tough trade negotiations which brought the two to the brink of a trade war several
times.
China's desire to gain entry to GATT/WTO has also been a source of tension
between the two countries. The US has insisted that Beijing must commit to a range
of WTO rules, but Beijing maintained that as a developing economy undergoing a
complex economic transformation, special treatments are necessary. The US
government maintained that China's accession to the WTO should be based on the
same rules that other members follow, and Americans should be able to do business
in China without going through a centralized government entity. Washington also
linked broader economic relations with China to the Hong Kong issue. In the words
of the Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, 'Hong Kong is an economic
dynamo. They are our 8th largest agricultural market, 4th in terms of consumer-
oriented products, with much of it headed into China ... We need a smooth
transition that nurtures their success and shows good-faith on China's part'.55
The economic role of Hong Kong in US-China relations has to be viewed from
the perspective of an increasingly integrated Hong Kong-Southern China economy.
The territory and China have become closely integrated economically since the end
of the 1970s. Economic integration and the narrowing of the income gap between
Hong Kong and mainland China have no doubt facilitated the process of Hong
Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty. The tremendous changes in China as a
result of the economic transformation has been so significant that it was described
as a second revolution marked with far reaching consequences for not only the
Chinese economy but also polity and society. The economic reform not only closed
economic distance between Hong Kong and China, but also cemented the two
together as economic partners.56 Their close economic relationship is reflected in
52. 1996 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program: Part VII Bilateral
Negotiations (section on China).
53. Wu Yi, 'China-US trade imbalance: an objective evaluation', Beijing Review 39(24), (10-16 June 1996).
54. 'China hits back US sanctions', Beijing Review 39(23), (3-9 June 1996).
55. Speech on China by Dan Glickman, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, (2 April 1997).
56. Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).
See also Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
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growing bilateral trade, Hong Kong's role as the entrepot for China, in cross border
manufacturing activities, and in mutual investments and business involvements.
Mainland China has become the third largest investor in the territory with
substantial investments in all the major commercial activities in Hong Kong. One
estimate suggested that mainland-backed enterprises registered in Hong Kong have
reached more than 1,700, employing 53,000 people with US$44 billion of assets.57
Hong Kong has always acted as the middleman between mainland China and the
outside world. The fact that it is one of the world's freest economies, with almost
no restrictions for foreign businesses and trade, has enabled it to act as a buffer
between China and major industrialized economies when economic difficulties
arise between them. In recent years, however, Hong Kong has also been a target
for US action over intellectual property protection and place of origin of textile
products. According to the US government Hong Kong's intellectual property laws
are among the best in the world, but a massive increase in pirate compact disc
production in China has weakened enforcement efforts in the territory. Washington
also identified Hong Kong businessmen as central players in the production of such
on the mainland as co-venturers in more than two-thirds of the pirate CD plants
operating in mainland China. The US government has suggested that, 'as reversion
to China moves ever closer, the challenge for Hong Kong will be to establish a
fundamental respect for intellectual property rights which will endure beyond
1997 '58
Hong Kong is caught between its economic linkages with the mainland which
have become its manufacturing base on the one hand, and its economic linkages
with the US which have always been based on open and free trade. US-China
differences over trade and economic matters could easily have a very significant
impact on the well-being of the territory. Observers in Hong Kong would still like
to see the territory playing a useful role in promoting understanding between the
two ideologically divided giant economies.59 If the US perceives the Hong Kong
economy as merely the extension of the mainland economy, its trade policy
towards the territory will likely to be far more aggressive. In the context of the
debate over the rise of China, Washington may perceive a politically submissive
Hong Kong with suspicion, thus adopting a less sympathetic view about bilateral
economic problems with Hong Kong.
Conclusions
The process of Hong Kong's reunification with China is highly complex and full
of ambiguities. While most Hong Kong people are Chinese, reunion with the
mainland has brought about anxieties and raised concerns on the territory's future.
Although the 'one country, two systems' formula is a recognition of the special
circumstances, the Chinese leadership is also determined to recover sovereignty
over Hong Kong.
Upon his election in December 1996 as the Chief Executive of the first Hong
57. Hong Kong Trade Development Council Reports.
58. US Trade Representative Office, 1996 National Trade Estimate: HONG KONG.
59. See for example, editorial in Ming Pao, (7 April 1997).
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Kong SAR government, Tung Chee-hwa announced that the people of Hong Kong
would become their own master, as the territory returns to the motherland.60 Tung,
however, also maintained that foreign cultures, which have made the territory's
outlook more international and cosmopolitan, is also an essential part of Hong
Kong. His vision of Hong Kong is, 'a caring society that has a strong social fabric;
a prosperous society filled with opportunities for all; and a proud society with a
global outlook that will play its part as China moves to the centre stage in the 21st
Century'.61 In April 1997 Tung proposed changes to the Public Order Ordinance
and Societies Ordinance which would put restrictions on public demonstrations
security and require all societies to be registered (registration could be rejected in
the interests of national security) as well as prohibit political organizations to
establish ties with foreign political organizations.62 Responding to Tung's proposal,
a White House spokesman warned that, 'The People's Republic knows the entire
world is watching very closely ... We viewed with some concern any effort that
would diminish the civil liberties and freedoms the people of Hong Kong has
enjoyed'. The Chinese government, irritated by American concerns over develop-
ments in the territory, rebuked that Washington had made 'irrational accusations
against necessary measures the Chinese government has adopted to safeguard a
smooth return of the territory to the motherland'.63 While Tung would probably
prefer to steer Hong Kong away from the troubles in US-China relations, his vision
that Hong Kong would be an important part of China with a global outlook, is
precisely the reason that Hong Kong would find it difficult to stay away from
difficulties in US-China relations.
The role of Hong Kong in US-China relations must be viewed through the
complex inter-play of strategic, political, and economic factors as discussed in this
paper. If Hong Kong could continue as a prosperous and free society with a global
outlook, it will probably facilitate China's integration with the global community.
But if the transition of Hong Kong turned out to be a transition towards authori-
tarian rule and a SAR with diminishing capacity in running its own affairs and
maintaining its position as an autonomous and free economy, then those who
advocate a more confrontational approach to the management of US-China
relations on both sides of the Pacific may gain the attention of wider audiences in
their respective domestic constituencies with highly undesirable consequences for
both countries.
60. Tung Chee Hwa's speech plus question and answer after his election as Chief Executive on 11 December 1996,
Wen Wei Po, (12 December 1996).
61. Tung Chee-hwa, speech to business chambers, 17 December 1996, Hong Kong. Extract in South China Morning
Post, (18 December 1996).
62. Details of Tung's proposal in South China Morning Post, (10 April 1997).
63. South China Morning Post, (12 April 1997).
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